The Transferred Workplace – Towards a Theory of Work in the Transnational Firm by Smith, Chris & Elger, Tony
 1 
The Transferred Workplace – Towards a Theory of Work in the Transnational 
Firm 
 
Chris Smith (Royal Holloway, University of London) and Tony Elger (University of 
Warwick) 
EGOS 2002 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper begins with a review of a recent debate on diffusion of work and 
employment relations that appeared with the sudden growth of Japanese FDI from the 
1980s. Within the development of this debate, discussion of ‘transfer’ became more 
sophisticated, but still remained bounded by stereotypes of ‘national business systems’ 
or national organizational and employment institutions, and the transplantation and 
transformation of work and employment relations within different ‘national’ 
workplaces (Elger and Smith, 1994). By way of critique of convergence/divergence 
dichotomies within this comparative organizational analysis, we introduce the idea that 
international workplaces reflect the three way interaction or triple determination given 
by political economy or mode of production (‘system effects’), unique national 
institutions, cultures and histories (‘societal effects’) and the diffusion of best practices 
or modernisation strategies by the ‘society-in-dominance’ at any particular period of 
global competition, such as the USA or Japan (‘dominance effects’) (Smith and 
Meiksins, 1995; Smith and Elger, 2000). This is what we are calling the SSD model, 
and the international firm will be penetrated by these three forces, and not simply a 
universal set of economically ‘efficient’ organizational practices versus a local set of 
institutional rules, customs, laws and relations. The nature of work within the modern 
international organisation is more complex than global-local, universal-national, 
convergence-divergences dichotomies. Moreover, one of the locational preferences for 
international firms, especially mass manufacturing companies, appears to be for 
clustered concentrations in ‘special zones’, ‘new towns’ or growth regions which 
frequently lie ‘outside’ national ‘rules of the game’ or permit ‘experimentation’ within 
‘national rules’, often influenced by alliances between local state and international 
capital. In these contexts general societal values and rules may not apply in the same 
way to international firms (Smith and Elger, 2000). 
 
This SSD structural model helps situate or contextualise the forces operating within and 
through the international firm. But social action is not structurally determined, merely 
constrained and shaped. For an understanding of production and employment relations, 
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we need to theoretically conceptualise the actions, strategies and tactics developed by 
workers and managers as they interact within the modern international workplace. Here 
we seek to develop labour process theorization of social action by examining what we 
are calling the ‘double indeterminacy of labour power’ in the international firm (Smith, 
2001). Workers have two powers within economic systems, there ‘mobility power’, 
deciding to whom to sell their labour services, and their ‘effort power’, influencing as 
individuals, groups and collective actors, the rate at which labour services are used up. 
Workers’ mobility projects reflect their constitution as waged labour, with rights to 
move to their advantage, but the constitution of these ‘freedoms’ varies between 
employment systems (‘societies’) and the way mobility power of the TNC interacts 
with labour power. Through global competition employers are seeking to control both 
powers – increasing effort and managing mobility – while workers are attempting to 
maximize both powers to their advantage, which may mean exchanges or trade offs 
between effort and mobility – employment security and reduced freedom of movement 
outside the firm in exchange for greater management control over labour effort and 
tractability as in the large, core Japanese firm. Within the ‘transferred workplace’, 
different solutions to this bargain will be developed, as the SSD structuring of the 
workplace changes from one location to another. In different settings the SSD forces 
will be arranged differently, but the firm will be seeking to maximize control over both 
effort and mobility powers of labour, and this is especially evident in cost-competitive 
areas of mass consumer goods, where TNCs have more choices of location and ways of 
using their mobility power as a critical asset of the international firm. For labour, 
mobility power also appears to be an important means of managing uncertainty, 
expressing dissatisfaction and correcting injustices, as witnessed by the high rates of 
separation or labour turnover in overseas concentrations of TNC investment, especially 
where organised representation and worker ‘voice’ are absent.  
 
The first part of the paper outlines the lessons from the Japanese ‘transplant’ debate and 
then details the system, society, dominance model as a way of moving beyond the crude 
idea of transfer within that debate. The second part outlines the ways in which the effort 
and mobility power of labour, and effort and mobility controls by capital appear within 
different labour processes of the transnational firm. By using the example of the 
mobility of the Japanese firm, we can trace different configurations of the management 
of mobility-effort powers in different country cases in order to illustrate employers and 
workers’ bargaining over effort and mobility labour powers in the transnational firm. 
This highlights different ways in which employment relations (through combinations of 
system, society and dominance in the different settings) are used to manage labour and 
workers responses. We do not wish to reduce decisions on FDI to labour issues - market 
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access, political stability and policy, path dependency from repeat transactions, 
regional integration, are all important motivations for the internationalization of capital 
(Dickin, 1998; Dunning, 1993; 2000). But we are suggesting that at workplace level, 
the theme of mobility affects capital and labour action, and the regimes that 
international firms develop come out of managing mobility of labour within different 
SSD configurations. 
  
Thinking comparatively: Japanese FDI, Transplants and Transfer 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there was an active debate on the transfer of Japanese 
management techniques from Japan into the West through the agency of the Japanese 
Transnational Company. To theorise this process, authors drew extensively on 
biological analogies, with concepts of ‘transplantation’ ‘adaptation’ and ‘hybridisation’, 
signifying different ways in which new entrants interacted with the new host 
environments. At different moments and in different societal contexts, ‘applying’ 
Japanese practices to new locations was considered straightforward, due to inherent 
and irresistible efficiency superiorities, thus normatively essential for the competitive 
survival of the Western firm (Womack et al 1990; Florida and Kenney, 1991). At other 
times it was regarded as a more interactive and problematical process of application and 
adaptation, involving considerable compromise for the Japanese firm (Abo 1994; 1998; 
Itagaki, 1997). Or as very creative and dynamic, where relocation produced new work 
forms, different from those in Japan and within the host society, and therefore 
unanticipated and unimagined prior to the process of Japanese subsidiary formation 
(Jurgens et al 1993; Beecher and Bird, 1994; Kenney and Florida, 1993; Smith, 1996; 
Boyer, et al 1998; Liker et al 1999; Freyssenet, et al 1999).  
 
Essential to these debates were assumptions that there existed robust and 
recognisable/measurable national (home/ownership) qualities, something distinctly 
Japanese, that could be isolated, defined and tracked through the process of exportation 
and localization. A Japanese ‘system’ or ‘model’. Equally, there had to be definable 
local, national (host) qualities, institutional rules and practices that could be identified 
and measured as being modified, challenged or transformed through interaction with 
new Japanese entrants. We needed ‘Japaneseness’ to measure Japanization. Britishness 
or Americanness to measure deviation, adjustment and transformation. Given the 
difficulty in isolating these ‘national’ qualities, and recording change, boundaries 
around units of analysis had to be tightly defined. Locating Japanese economic success 
in the Japanese firm (and not society, state, economy or history) facilitated such system 
closure (Turnball, 1986; Ackroyd, et al 1988). This meant isolating overseas action at 
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workplace or company level (and not locality or sector, for example), and this was 
accomplished by directing attention to variables that could supposedly be isolated and 
taken to ‘represent’ Japaneseness: techniques, practices and ways of organising defined 
in national (and later neutral engineering) terms whose presence, adoption or 
appearance could then be used as an analogue for local change. Thus, JIT, TQM, 
continuous improvement, cellular manufacturing, long-term employment relations, 
relational contracting etc were isolated as distinctly Japanese practices, and therefore 
evidence of their utilization by non-Japanese firms read as signs of diffusion and 
emulation; and evidence of their application within the Japanese overseas firm, proof of 
successful ‘transplantation’.  
 
One major problem with this entire approach is that social relations, actor 
consciousness, action and reaction was either not considered, or if so, treated as 
marginal to the theme of ‘transfer’ and ‘transplantation’, which was a largely 
mechanical or technical process, and not one mediated through human agency and 
therefore, requiring interpretation. Modern management practices, like bits of 
technology, were thought capable of isolation and transfer (Ferner, 1997). Reactions 
from actors took the simple (idealized) forms of favourable or non-favourable attitudes 
towards working with the Japanese (Trevor, 1983; White and Trevor, 1983). But mostly, 
it was assumed that workers would be positive towards the alleged greater 
‘involvement’ in decision making typically regarded as part of Japanese work practices 
(Womack, et al 1990; MacDuffie, 1995; Kenney and Florida, 1993). Later ethnographic 
accounts of ‘life on the line’ in Japanese subsidiaries or emulator plants highlighted a 
much more mundane, routine and pressured picture of work and authority relations 
(Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Graham, 1995; Delbridge, 1998; Palmer, 1996; 2000; 
Sharpe 1997; 1998). Delbridge (1998: 203-4), for example noted that certain ‘technical’ 
aspects of the Japanese production system were present in his 2 case companies – 
quality regime, inventory control and grouping of activities – but none of the ‘social’ 
sides of the Japanese model were present - security of employment, team working, 
seniority pay – echoing earlier work by Milkman (1991; 1992) in the United States and 
Dedousis (1994; 1995) in Australia (see Elger and Smith, 1994 for a review). What 
such studies suggest is that certain practices identified as Japanese had become ‘system’ 
requirements (neutral, rationalisation standards for production in the current period), 
whereas others, the ‘social’ side, were either tied to Japanese socio-state institutional 
relations, and hence were ‘non-transferable’ as ‘societal effects’ (see below). Or else a 
particular form of the ‘social’ involving organisational mechanisms that generated tight 
management control, often underpinned (both outside Japan and within ‘peripheral’ 
Japan) by union weakness and labour market insecurities.  
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What this research on transplants and emulators highlighted, was firstly that Japanese 
subsidiaries managed very well with only the ‘technical’ (system) side in place, and did 
not need the (Japanese/societal) ‘social’ side in order to function efficiently or 
effectively – indeed the technical side was also unevenly applied by sector (Abo, 1994; 
1998). This was because aspects of the Japanese ‘social’ system could be reproduced 
through ‘functional equivalents’ to the core Japanese employment system, which 
created the social subordination of labour through mechanisms within and beyond the 
workplace, such as subsidiary location in vulnerable labour markets, single union deals 
and tight supervisory monitoring (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1993; Delbridge, 1998). We 
have elsewhere referred to this as producing ‘good enough production’ in subsidiaries 
(Elger and Smith, 1999a). But our work in Japanese subsidiaries in a clustered, new 
town context, also found that the social side was partly ‘neutral’, and therefore 
disconnected or independent of the ‘technical’ side, but also that there were ‘common’ 
or ‘standard’ forms to work and employment relations, and common reactions by 
workers in these factories. So, in our new town research site, Japanese firms 
experienced high labour turnover, which meant that securing the labour force (through 
recruiting older workers and preventing voluntary exits) became a priority. Insecurity 
of labour created problems for management and reduced training, compressed or 
shortened induction and selection procedures, and inhibited or prevented continuous 
improvements and full TQM activities, either because management had no intention of 
implementing these practices. Or because workers were not stable, and any training 
investments would be lost due to quitting, or workers would quit if additional demands 
were placed upon them. In other words, in this labour market situation, where 
employers were constrained by workers mobility power, core (‘technical’) elements of 
Japanese production practices (‘core’ in the literature, at least) could not be 
implemented, even amongst those large Japanese firms that had some intention of 
applying them. Moreover, workers were balancing effort and mobility powers, and 
employers were making trade offs between these two powers in managing them. And 
the two types of power interacted – the increase in effort demands from management 
increasing labour mobility, and the high level of mobility inhibiting effort 
intensification practices such as TQM or JIT.  
 
Therefore the ‘social’ side - human relations, employment practices and work 
organisation - within the critical, ethnographic ‘transplant’ research had certain features 
which were independent of the local or host societal institutions within which they 
lodged. Such features as routine jobs, high patterns of labour turnover, low wages, 
contractual segmentation of labour, cut across the subsidiaries in different countries, 
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suggesting, what Dedousis (1994) calls a ‘high cost’ (Japan as core) versus a ‘low cost’ 
(rest-of-the-world as peripheral) Japanese business strategy that mirrors the split in 
Japan between a core of large firms and subordinate chain of peripheral contractor 
firms. We have criticized this model as too simplistic for all Japanese subsidiaries and 
all national locations (Elger and Smith, 1994). But one element within this 
core-periphery theory of the Japanese TNC that is important is that subsidiaries are not 
simply defined by their host or local environment (‘societal effects’) - an assumption 
common to comparative analysis (Child, 2000) - but retain ‘dominant’ features of 
subordination (for labour) independently of national location. This suggests that we 
need to treat the TNC as an independent player in diffusing cross-national practices, 
and not simply as constructed through universal or societal social action (Smith and 
Elger, 2000; Child, 2000). It also suggests that state-TNC interactions create particular 
geographical spaces that are common across divergent national economies (in new 
towns, special economic zones, growth corridors) and within these spaces similar work 
organisation and employment relations are practiced and provoke similar reactions 
from workers. This important finding alters the simplicity of diffusion models from 
mother to sister plants, or home to host society. It also alters a purely ‘national’ 
(adaptation/application) model. This is because the TNCs interact with a number of 
country contexts that have the effects of reproducing their own spaces – special areas – 
which operate with rules (for capital and labour) that are partially autonomous of 
country (host and home) contexts.  
 
On the one hand, efforts at ‘transfer’ by the international firm signal the weakness of 
host national institutional or cultural rules, and the limitation of a ‘societal effect’ model 
which, predicts national conformance of the firm to national institutional rules (see 
below). On the other hand, the difficulties of transfer suggest the robustness of local 
institutions. But what both ‘Japanization’ and ‘localisation’ perspectives miss out is that 
the effect of regional or geographical clustering by the Japanese firm qua TNC, 
(concentrating investments in particular regions, such as those with high 
unemployment for example) is to create autonomy from ‘national’ societal rules that 
such concentrations can create. As we discuss below, the striving for distinctive 
clustering and concentrations (in new towns, special economic zones an growth 
corridors) by the international firm signals its autonomous action, developing 
employment and work organisation strategies that are independent of national rules, but 
also different from practices in their home setting. Hence clustering is a special space 
for experimentation (Smith and Elger, 2000) that produces its own reactions – such as 
the high turnover of labour discussed below.   
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The ‘transferred firm’ was also not simply constrained by the new host environment, 
and its cultural-institutional diversities, but also by differences in the demand 
conditions of the subsidiary and the strategic operations and policy of the parent 
company. There is a tendency to homogenise the pattern of transfer within this second 
approach – with all Japanese subsidiaries portrayed as routine, Neo-Fordist assembly 
operations carrying scaled down, minimum or low-cost ‘Japanese’ practices and either 
absorbent of local practices (Milkman, 1991; 1992) or applying those from the 
Japanese small firm, periphery (Dedousis, 1994; 1995). But, on the whole the drift in 
debate has been from categorical certainties and holistic typologies, towards an 
emphasis on contingency, difference and diversity through research encounters with 
Japanese subsidiaries in varied local settings. In simple terms those writers highlighting 
divergences have been in the ascendancy in the 1990s, when in the 1980s, those 
emphasizing convergence, borrowing and standardization to a new one best way of 
positively integrating workers into the firm (Womack et al 1990) or enhancing their 
exploitation and submission (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Garrahan and Stewart 1992) 
held centre stage. The story moved towards recognition of growing complexity and 
contingency, as research and business practice revealed the Japanese firm to be 
heterogeneous, without an archetypal representativeness of a whole nation, and not 
unproblematically economically dominant, but with inherent production and employee 
performance inefficiencies, being differentiated, diverse and frequently failing in its 
specific integration into global capitalism (Haslam et al 1996). 
 
But even these later critical accounts, valuable as they are, were working within the 
terms of the debate in which capital possesses nationally distinct features, which can be 
moved around, transplanted and imposed within settings other that the home territory. 
The accounts were strongly ownership focused (Encarnation and Mason, 1994). They 
therefore missed aspects of the way in which labour was attached to the firm, and ways 
in which workers managed the sale of their labour power within these settings. 
Concomitantly, they ignored key features of Japanese capital, qua internationalised 
capital, namely that it moves between countries, is subject to global cost pressures, is, 
as transnational capital, largely indifferent to locality except as mediated through 
business strategy (for cost or market access), and this in turn provokes in labour, more 
mobility based forms of resistance and reaction.  
 
Recent work by Morgan et al (2000) indicates that Japanese firms in Britain have been 
withdrawing at the low-cost end, putting production to lower-cost regions such as S E 
Asia, and higher-end production to skill-intensive countries within the EU, such as 
Germany. In other words, developing a regional division of labour in and beyond 
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Europe, similar to regional patterns of design, development, high and low end 
manufacture in Asia (Cheung and Wong, 2000). Research on the mobility of Japanese 
firms in the US (Kenney and Florida, 1994; Kenney et al 1998; 1999) suggests a drift 
out of the US and into Mexico, or back to S.E Asia for low-end, cost sensitive 
production, and the closure or rationalization of many Japanese American subsidiaries 
in the process. Research in SE Asia indicates a shifting pattern of mobility within the 
region, but with a strong drift towards China for cost and market access reasons 
(Cheung and Wong, 2000). In other words, the ‘mobility’, the high exits, and global 
re-positioning of manufacturing operations within a global division of labour, needs to 
be factored into any assessment of the ‘subsidiary-in-context’. On the one hand the 
context, (UK, US, S E Asia, Japan, Europe) is vital for understanding the types of work 
relations and employment relations that get ‘transferred’ or applied. On the other hand, 
however, these contexts are interlinked through the actions of the firm, through ‘regime 
shopping’ (Streeck, 1992), and, ‘locational bargaining’ (Mueller, 1994; 1996), which 
provide leverage on local states and the internal regime of the factory. These are 
features of the ‘mobility bargain’ (Smith, 2001) of capital in its dealings with labour. 
And the clustering by TNCs (in collusion with local states, or for inter-firm supply 
chain linkages) means they can act with some independence from host society 
institutions – but, subject to special conditions operating in clustered-investment sites.  
 
Cases and Contexts 
 
Telford had 21 Japanese companies at its peak, but it’s now down to 15. One of our 4 
Telford companies moved operations or exited the UK during our fieldwork period – a 
figure not unrepresentative of current exits of Japanese firms from the UK to low-cost 
labour regimes in China and SE Asia. Consequently, not stability, but instability, not 
long-term employment, but short-term, and not training, continuous improvement, and 
innovative working practices, but routine, assembly tasks and factories are created 
through these temporal contingencies (Kenney et al 1999; Lowe et al 2000; Smith, 
Elger and Ladino, 2001).  
 
Our work in Telford found high levels of labour turnover which was surprising to us, 
and to the initial panel of Japanese firms, who nevertheless through a process of 
interacting with workers, British personnel managers and each other, evolved counter 
strategies to manage rather that substantially reduce labour turnover (Smith and Elger, 
1998ab; Smith, Daskalaki, Elger and Brown, 2002). (See Table 1) Finding 
contra-evidence, high mobility instead of low, made us look carefully at the nature of 
Telford as a new town, dominated by manufacturing employment that is predominantly 
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transnational in character. The assumption was initially that our panel of Japanese firms 
(the most highly concentrated cluster of Japanese firms in Britain) was aberrant in 
having such high rates of labour turnover. That the mobile character of labour in the 
‘new town’ setting facilitated deviation from other concentrations in Wales, Scotland 
and elsewhere. In other words, our findings were atypical due to location contingencies. 
However in subsequent examination of other clustered sites of transnational investment 
in Mexico, and more recently China (Smith 2002) we have found similar strategies, 
similar low skilled jobs, gender segmentation, and collusive relations between 
employers, and remarkably high rates of labour turnover, which are managed, rather 
that being reduced to low levels by the action of managers in the firms. Employers also 
use similar strategies to control labour mobility, but within different society-state 
contexts, controls can be more or less coercive. For example, in China TNCs take a 
‘bond’ from workers, which is returned to them after their contract, to prevent them 
from exiting within contract. Withholding of wages is a cruder practice. All TNCs 
operate with dormitories to attach daily labour supply to the firm. Nevertheless, labour 
turnover is very high – ranging from 10-90% in a case study of seven electronic TNCs. 
In a recent study of a German TNC, average labour turnover of 55% was recorded over 
a 3-year period, despite workers paying a high ‘bond’ to the firm (Smith, 2002). 
 
Therefore, looked at globally, in Mexico, South East Asia and in parts of the United 
States, the management strategies used to retain workers long enough to earn a return 
from their labour services, are not particular to the Japanese or location, but possibly 
characteristic of certain types of high volume, cost-sensitive mass production engaged 
in by international capital. And worker’s use of ‘mobility power’ to express discontent 
and improve wages and conditions, is similarly not ownership, labour market or 
locality specific, but appears as a common response to working within internationalized 
firms inside development zones, growth corridors, new towns and sites in which TNCs 
geographically concentrate. What this suggests is that mobility of capital and mobility 
of labour interact; that retention strategies and workers leaving strategies interact. But 
more importantly, that nationality of capital might not appear to matter in significantly 
altering the way in which labour and capital interact within these internationalised, 
clustered settings. 
 
Shallow and deep roots in the local for the transferred assembly factory 
 
Transferred assembly factories typically produce products that have been designed, 
manufactured and are to be marketed elsewhere and these factories have a semi- and 
unskilled workforce. In as much as unskilled labour is more widely available, and 
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in-house skills have been minimised through systematic task ‘fool-proofing’, the 
transferred assembly factory may have ‘shallow’ roots in the local environment. That is 
to say, it draws on skills which are globally widely distributed, and does not require 
many internalised, firm-specific skills or scarcer, craft or technical skills that may be 
concentrated in fewer places globally, and hence restrict location choice for the firm. 
Without a high skill base or firm-specific skills, the autonomy of the factory from HQ 
will be limited. The subsidiary has few power resources in the form of expensive 
human and material assets, and the requirements for production may be available from 
many geographical sites around the world. Hence cost competition will be intense to 
attract FDI in the form of transferred assembly factories.  
 
Management within such factories may, over time, seek to develop ‘deeper’ roots. This 
is the likely strategy of local management, and may even be supported or promoted by 
ex-pat management from the parent company as they seek to imitate practices from the 
home country. This is likely to take the form of beginning to manufacture parts for 
products in-house, increasing the skill inputs and so strengthening local ties and 
increasing the autonomy of the firm from HQ by means of ‘localisation’. This may 
reduce the threat of cost-based competition from other subsidiary sites where pools of 
cheap labour are available. But to build material and human assets within a subsidiary 
of a TNC may require political capital that local (indigenous) management will lack, 
and they are likely to be dependent on the network power of ex-pat managers. 
Inevitably some managers will have more power, personal networks and resources to 
mobilise in favour of such ‘deepening’ strategies that others. In our case studies in 
Telford, at Copy-co and Parts-co there was evidence of deepening strategies, but at 
PCB-co skill levels remained the same, the vulnerability of the Telford factory to 
Chinese competition meant it was easy to close the factory, and the life cycle of the 
factory in Telford was short, less than a decade. This suggests that developing roots in 
the local environment is necessary for the survival of the factory to the extent that cost 
(rather than market access, which remain important) becomes the major survival 
strategy for the company. But such a deepening strategy is not inevitable. Take the case 
of Japanese electrical assembly production in the United States.  
 
The history of Japanese electrical assembly production in the United States suggests the 
following patterns: the initial ‘transferred’ factories were brownfield, unionised US 
plants. Due to contradictions (especially labour conflicts) within this form, the next 
Japanese firms sought sole investment or takeovers of non-unionised US factories. 
These firms, according to Milkman (1991, 1992) followed more an American 
non-union HRM agenda, than a Japanese one. Finally many of these plants were closed 
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and production moved to greenfield, non-unionised Mexican maquiladoras shipping 
products into the US market (Kenney and Florida, 1994). These moves were facilitated 
by political regulation such as the NAFTA, but also the weakness of US unions in being 
unable to prevent the movement of Japanese assembly factories from brownfield, 
unionised to non-unionised plants within the United States.  
 
We can categorise the 3 stages in the evolution of Japanese capital formation in the 
electrical assembly industry in the United States: 
 
Phase 1 Japanese plants within American institutions: ‘Americanisation’ 
Phase 2 Japanese plants breaking with American institutions: ‘hard’ HRM 
Phase 3 Japanese plants outside American institutions: ‘Maquilarization’ 
 
Within two decades the electrical assembly industry of Japanese (but also US and 
European firms) had made 3 moves, all of which follow a cost-reduction logic, but also 
a logic of creating a sort of localisation in which management prerogatives were 
increased.  
 
However, such enhanced management control does not mean labour is passive. 
Workers in the three contexts struggled in different ways, and had difference resources 
at hand. Kenney and Florida (1993) use the example of Sharp to illustrate these 
struggles: strikes and collective bargaining disputes in American brownfield unionised 
plants of Phase 1. Higher labour turnover in greenfield US and Mexican plants in 
Phases 2 and 3. Thus strategies for workers within this logic shifted from typical 
collective, organised labour forms of struggle using collective bargaining, trade union 
employment and job controls, to more individual strategies, such as high labour 
mobility between plants to improve wages, conditions and social justice. 
 
The changing location and structure of the industry highlights three points for plant or 
firm-level research. Firstly the importance of sector or industry strategy/logic, and for 
seeing firm action against a backdrop of sector trends, norms and structural forces, all 
of which impose limits on the action of the individual firm. Secondly, the movement 
away from ‘societal conditions’ to special locational ones, maquiladoras having special 
features distinctive from earlier Mexican business ‘rules of the game’. Thirdly, it 
highlights the importance of temporality, and restrictions on writing plant accounts or 
explanation of action, which will, of necessity, reflect particular temporal choices 
within particular ‘phases’ of development within the sector. In other words, during the 
early formation of Japanese firms in this sector, there will have been a greater 
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commitment to transfer, train and educate American workers and managers into 
Japanese methods, but at the same time as preserving American institutions. By the 
time the sector shifts to Mexico, plans for transfer (other than an imperative to 
stringency) were subordinate to establishing what Kenney et at (1999) call 
‘reproduction’ as opposed to ‘innovation’ factories. Without having an awareness of 
which stage of development one is describing as a field researcher, it is easy to make 
mistaken generalisations on the issue of ‘transfer’. 
 
If we look at factory formation in another country – Australia for example – then AAA 
was the first overseas plant of Denso and the first factory was very ‘Australian’ in 
character. It was established in an old industrial manufacturing site in Melbourne, with 
a highly unionised and organised workforce. But over time, the company established a 
new greenfield factory under new union rules that favoured management in a 
non-militant, Anglo-Saxon suburb of Melbourne (and closed the older site). The new 
factory applied the most modern management practices, using psychology consultants 
to profile individuals and teams on a regular basis, using contemporary HRM practices 
extensively. But the new factory remained vulnerable to competition from 
non-Australian factories in non-unionised areas of SE Asia. But politically, it would be 
difficult to close the plant and so move to low cost countries, as the high import tariffs 
would make such a move costly. Nevertheless, with greater regional integration, this 
move could happen.  
 
The pattern of factory formation in Japanese electrical assembly in the US and Japanese 
auto-parts assembly in Australia is one of seeking weaker institutional localisation. 
Management at the plant level progressively increasing autonomy over workers 
(through moving into non-union or less militant worker environments) by physical 
movement (to greenfield or new spaces with shallow institutional bonds such as the 
switch into Mexico). This pattern of de-localisation may be cost-driven – searching out 
lowing cost production sites – but it is also control-driven, searching out locations in 
which management prerogatives are unchallenged, and workers more isolated in 
responding to management. Typically the moves represent a shift to non-union settings, 
where workers power is expressed through mobility, rather than internal organisation. 
What we witness in these examples is mobility as a management power, with the 
location and re-location of factories a relatively easy process, and one which has major 
implications for capital labour relations. 
 
The Idea of Transfer 
 
 13 
Can we, from this specialized literature on the Japanese overseas firm, learn something 
about the nature of work and work relations within the international firm in general? 
Can we learn something about ‘transfer’ as a process? Can we learn something about 
work relations for managers and workers within internationalized capital as a whole? 
From the experience of the Japanese debate, caution is required in abstraction and 
generalization, without evidence or with too much prescription and normative 
judgment. The term ‘transferred workplace’ is used to denote stability and mobility, 
transfer having the double meaning of the sending or movement of an object from point 
A to point B, but also some transformation and change to the object through the process 
of movement. The ‘object’ in this context is subjective and objective, structural and 
processual, being work and employee social relations, the way work is organized, and 
the way workers are brought in, attached, stabilized and moved through and out of the 
firm. It embraces the strategies employed by managers in attracting, retaining and 
controlling workers, and the strategies developed by workers in moving themselves 
into, up and out of the firm, and reacting to and interacting with management control 
intentions. As individual volition is involved in all these human processes, mediation, 
reflexivity and consciousness of action are present in constituting the object under 
review, and it is part of our argument that the research process of examining work 
relations inside the ‘transferred workplace’ should be sensitive to these constructionist 
elements, and to avoid functionalism, structuralism and other deterministic approaches 
to the firm, dominant in much writing on TNCs.  
 
Mobility is central to capital in the internationalized workplace; it being the defining 
feature of transnational as opposed to locally constrained capital. This mobility is 
important for workers and for managers, as the potential temporariness of the firm in 
any one site, produces high labour mobility and contracted tenure for workers, who are 
recruited and integrated quickly to ensure a return on their labour services. Mobility 
through exits is the main means of expressing worker preference in production sites 
where transnational capital clusters – new towns, development zones, growth corridors, 
special economic regions, such as Mexico (Kenney and Florida, 1994; Kenney et al 
1998; 1999; Smith, Elger and Ladino 2001), Southern China (Ngai, 1999; Lee, 1998; 
Smith 2002), or new towns in the UK (Elger and Smith, 1998; Smith 2001). As we 
explore, the fracturing of the workforce by capital to deal with such turnover, especially 
between long-tenure and short-tenure groups, local and migrants, dispatched managers 
and local managers, occurs along national, geographical and gender lines, but 
segmentation, core and peripheralisation are features of transferred workplaces, 
reflected again both mobility and immobility features of internationalized capital.  
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We attempt to avoid the dual pitfalls of theorising with too little context and too much 
(Child 2000) by locating the TNC and work relations within it inside analytical 
structures which present a triple determination, what we call system, society and 
dominance effects (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Smith and Elger, 2000). This model 
recognizes that capitalist production rationalization has ‘national’ traits, such as the link 
between Taylor, Taylorism and the United States; or Ford, Fordism and the US. But also, 
that diffusion of new production and employment ideas through international firms, 
consultancy channels, academic discourse and universal management educational 
processes (such as the global commodity of an MBA), aims to de-link the sources of 
ideas (Taylorism and Fordism in the US, Toyotism in Japan) from national contexts 
through the process of diffusion (Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986; Kogut and Parkinson, 
1993; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). De-linking stresses the universal efficiency gains 
that all organisations will receive from the adoption of new ‘best practices’. 
Nevertheless, application and adaptation of novel practices within the workplace, 
especially the TNC subsidiary, will raise themes of ‘ownership’, until techniques 
become ‘global best practices’ (Sklair, 2001) denationalized, and diluted or altered 
through the diffusion process. The system, society and dominance model aims to 
capture the complexity of ‘transfer’ within the modern, internationalised workplace, 
recognizing the sources of differences which come into the firm through home or local 
practices (societal contexts), standard or system forces, such as the ascribed roles of 
worker and managers in capitalist relations of production - the authority and control 
relations suggested by the ‘rules of the game’ these actors play in different political 
economic formations (capitalism or state socialism for example). And finally, the 
importance of ‘society-in-dominance’ or the standard setter for modern employment 
and work relations, which continually fuels competition between companies and 
nations by holding up the latest business, production or employment practice originated 
in the alleged more efficient/dominant society or company within a market, sector or 
region, and diffused through various agencies that gain from packaging and trading 
‘best practice’ knowledge and information. 
 
System effects 
 
In detail, system effects are what come through common social relations or purposes – 
for example the desire to work for private gain, rather than enhanced community status 
or common bonds of group or collective interest. System is ‘political economy’ - such 
as capitalism or state socialism - which produces common interests and similar 
problems, regardless of the country context within which, say capitalist social relations 
are located. State Socialism has generic features, typically an accentuated role for the 
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state in economic affairs, the planning and management of the firm, control of labour 
allocation and constraints on managers’ freedom to hire and fire workers. System is 
therefore ‘political’ and ‘economic’. In addition, system can refer to global technology 
or techniques and ways of working that are diffused as common standards through such 
channels as management textbooks. Capitalist competition, technological dynamism 
and capital-labour conflict underpin and exert common pressures on all specific 
manifestations of capitalist social relations, within enterprises, sectors or national 
economies. It is these underlying dynamics, with their associated conflicts and 
uncertainties that we refer to under the heading of system imperatives.  
 
Systemic features of capitalism begin with the capitalist employment relationship. Paid 
work in a capitalist society is structured by the drive for capital accumulation and 
profitable production. This motivates firms, which are activated by actors, managers 
and workers drawn into definite social relations for this purpose. Workers are motivated 
to sell their labour power to the highest bidder, managers have to take this ‘raw 
material’ and combine it with social forces of production (tools, equipment and 
technology and material objects for work) and a purpose, profitable production, which 
are animated the rules of capitalist economic action. Within relations between waged 
workers and employers (or their ‘representatives’) there is an exchange, an 
employment relationship in which wages are exchanged for labour services. However, 
the precise amount of work or labour effort to be expended for economic return is left 
open-ended, as is the precise nature of the tasks to be performed, their sequencing, the 
particular standard of work, the performance criteria, the quality of the authority and 
human relations between those who employ and those who are employed.  
 
Universal or what we’re calling ‘systemic’ theorising assumes a standardised or 
standardising workplace in which technology, science and managerial discourse aims at 
creating common methodologies regardless of the sector or country in which the firm is 
operating. System thinking is common to all deductive reasoning, which builds on 
abstract concepts, in which context-dependent rationality is suspended for the purposes 
of building ideal or pure typologies. 
 
Societal Effects 
 
Against this approach, there is writing that seeks to make conditional or 
context-dependent statements about the world and work organisations. In practice the 
systemic features of capitalist development are not simply expressed in a uniform 
fashion across the global economy. Most notably, they are in key respects both 
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mediated and crystallized in a distinctive fashion within specific nation states. 
Furthermore, national institutional patterns are not confined to the environments of 
corporate enterprises, but penetrate powerfully into their internal operations. It is such 
features which have been high-lighted, but in turn overstated, by the contemporary 
family of theories of societal effects, institutional settlements and national business 
systems, for each of these approaches tends to reify societal influences as a 
configuration of dominant and self-contained determinants of organisational 
arrangements within the ambit of each specific nation state (Maurice and Sorge, 2000; 
Hollingsworth, et al 1994; Sorge, 1991; Lane, 1995; Whitley 1992).  
 
A leading school here discusses the ‘societal effects’ of theorizing work, and suggests 
an irreducible diversity to work organisation, regardless of common factor inputs or 
modes of systemic rationalising (Maurice and Sorge, 2000). This is because the ‘rules 
of the game’ under which managers and workers interact are formed by unique cultural 
and institutional codes. As these codes or rules emerge through the historical process 
within each country, they are unique. Any systemic thinking on work organisation 
according to this logic will be filtered through distinctive inimitable agencies, and 
therefore be set to perpetually reproduce diversity. A country’s history cannot be wiped 
clean, or only in exceptional circumstances of wars or colonization, and even then 
cultural differences persist at sub-national levels. Therefore from this literature, 
diversity in work organization is normal and persistent. In extreme form, this school 
discounts the idea of the capitalist labour process; all that exists are national variants of 
‘ways of working’, a menu of social relations prepared by national histories and not 
economic or functional structures of a supra-national capitalist system. 
 
Societal theorists divide into functionalists, who suggest efficiency advantages 
determine national success, and psychological theorists, who suggests the subjective 
attachments to existing national regimes act as ‘sunk costs’ that are hard to change 
(Lane, 1995). Both use over-socialised modes of thinking in which change is difficult, 
and individuals as subordinate to externally imposed ‘social facts’, which come 
through existing ‘rules of the game’ operating in any national context: 
 
‘National-sectoral regimes of economic governance evolve over time and constitute historically 
grown social facts for each generation of traders. At any give point, economic actors are 
confronted with a legacy of local social institutions that are not of their making; not subject to 
their choosing; not in principle amenable to contractual reordering; and whose functional and 
evolutionary logic is different from that of a market or a formal-organisational hierarchy. At the 
centre of this logic is the ability of governance regimes to impose socially constructed 
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collective obligations on individuals, if necessary against their resistance...In the real world, the 
“givenness” of an industrial order is visible in its ability to socialize its subjects into distinctive 
identities. While individuals “belonging to” a particular order may undertake to remake it - for 
example, in line with the perceived imperatives of efficiency and “economizing” - in doing so 
they are forced to observe its present modus operandi and the constraints it imposes upon them 
(in other words, to accept its “path dependency”).’ (Hollingsworth et al (1994: 278-9) 
(emphasis in the original) 
 
‘Country’ boundaries around work (through social institutions, laws, values and 
attitudes) remain one of the key ways in which organisations are distinguished in this 
model. The approach has a number of problems. Firstly, organisations that move 
between societies – TNCs – may not be ‘nationally-bounded’ as implied above, but 
draw from an internationally diverse range of practices. Secondly, super-national forces 
- technology, science, management best practices, international firms – operate to make 
a nation’s economic base diverse, and are not simply reflective of internal national 
institutional ‘rules of the game’ (Sorge, 1991).  
 
Thirdly, as the Japanese ‘transplant’ research reveals, while there is not a simple 
diffusion of something called a ‘Japanese model’ or a generic ‘Japanization’, there are 
certainly real traces of borrowing, learning, transfer and transformation through the 
interaction of internationally dominant TNCs in national economies (Smith and Elger, 
2000). 
 
Fourthly, TNCs effect global, regional and trans-state forms of interdependence and 
integration, often based on cost-driven and market driven business strategies, or the 
construction of different ‘global commodity chains’ (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; 
Gereffi, 1994, 1996). These, while not suppressing institutional and value differences 
between societies, tend to create common policy response/instruments within states 
desperate to attract FDI – such as low/no tax incentives, special labour codes, as found 
in new towns, ‘special’ development regions and zones. It is the adoption of these 
common policy instruments designed to pull investment, and the consequent clustering 
of manufacturing capital, that create distinctive management and labour responses – the 
high turnover and management retention strategies outlined below.  
 
Finally, capitalist firms in different societies are not all equivalent in terms of 
efficiencies and productivity, and where economic goods are tradable through TNCs, 
such differences inform location choices, but also national policy makers, who place 
comparative economic advantage on the agenda, and press towards the adoption of 
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modern technologies, techniques and practices to ‘compete with the best’. Such 
emulation - again present in the Japanization debate – creates homogenization or 
globalisation pressures, which tend to test and erode local or national institutional rules 
and practices. The comparative evaluation of the economic performance between 
countries, raises borrowing as a possibility, even though in practical terms, taking 
practices and policies from one country and ‘transferring’ them to another is far from 
straightforward – as discussed above. The fact that it occurs repeatedly needs 
explaining and is not self-evident from a pure ‘societal effects’ perspective in which 
countries compete with each other through divergent, but ‘functionally equivalent’ 
organizational means and methods. This leads to a discussion of differences between 
societies, and the ‘dominance effects’ these create through the competitive pressure of 
the global marketplace. 
 
But perhaps the biggest problem with the ‘societal effects’ school is in explaining, 
theoretically, why there are continued convergence pressures within supposedly 
nationally bounded economies? Two reasons suggest themselves. Firstly, the appeals to 
‘efficiency’ and ‘economising’ i.e. abstract economic or market principles, exist in all 
capitalist societies as system imperatives. The fact that societies are institutionally 
different does not mean systemic value statements are not made by commentators, 
academics and public opinion formers, such as the media and international business 
interests. And secondly, dominant countries provide models of ‘best practice’ that 
involve the packaging of national operations into neutral organisation inputs or the 
selective borrowing of ‘best practices’ from national agendas. This is because of the 
economic inequality between societies and the nature of capitalist competition. These 
forces require integration into ‘national’ perspectives on the firm. 
 
Thus, whilst the theorists of societal effects have begun to develop valuable accounts of 
the sources of diversity in national trajectories of capitalist development and class 
relations, these accounts have concentrated upon the internal logics of institutional 
development which are held to explain persistent distinctiveness, while giving little 
attention to the ways in which evolving relations among states alter the terrain upon 
which national ‘systems’ operate.  
 
Dominance Effects 
 
The third element in the argument concerns the uneven nature of economic power, and 
the tendency for one society to take the lead in evolving work organisation or business 
practices considered more efficient than others. Hence, these lead societies create 
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‘dominance effects’, which circulate as ‘best practices or global standards that are 
emulated by other societies. In this way, societies do not face each other as equals, but 
with uneven capabilities, which encourages the process of learning and borrowing or 
diffusion and dominance. Added to which, the globalisation of capital, means 
international companies operate in several regions and societies, and home practices 
might be retained if they are judged to yield competitive advantage to the firm.  
 
Within the debate on the Japanese model, we have seen a clear relationship between the 
economic success of Japan, and the intense interest by firms and governments in 
wishing to ‘learn’ from and ‘borrow’ Japanese ideas. But in order to make these more 
acceptable or to neutralize their societal origins, systemic and non-societal technical 
terms are invented, such as ‘lean production’ or TQM or ‘continuous improvement’. 
While originating in Japan, circulation creates a different discourse, and association 
with the Japanese context may be broken – this was especially important as the 
‘dominance’ of the Japanese economy faded in the 1990s. Dominance effects signal the 
idea that one society originates ideas, and may seek to diffuse these, as new standards, 
but through the process of diffusion, there occurs a distillation of the ideas into 
‘societal’ and ‘systemic’ elements. This is what we have described for the Japan debate, 
and what we have elsewhere described for the debate on Taylorism: 
 
‘Taylorism…was initially bounded by the constraints of American capitalism; but its diffusion 
transformed it into a ‘best practice’ which was seen as a system requirement in some 
economies…The identification of Taylorism with American economic success made it difficult 
to resist. Disentangling the three influences of society, system and dominance has always been 
part of the critique of Taylorism as it became a dominant ideology and began to diffuse to 
Europe and Japan; but we could say that it was only with the emergence of other dominant 
capitalist states, in Europe and Japan, that such a critique has been able to separate these levels, 
and identify what in Taylorism is specific to America, what is part of capitalism, and what held 
sway only through American economic hegemony and not intrinsic qualities of Taylorism 
itself.’ (Smith and Meiksins, 1995: 263-4). 
 
International firms and SSD 
 
Therefore, whether through copying, imposition or diffusion, work organisation 
practices and techniques coalesce by combining systemic, societal and dominant ways 
of working, especially for internationalised segments of capital. This means, analysis 
needs to be sensitive to the way these elements interact within any particular workplace. 
Management theorising is typically systemic or dominant in orientation. Prescriptions 
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for the ‘latest’ practice are typically drawn from so called ‘leading’ nations, with the 
United States the most cited society due to its superior economic position in world 
capitalism. Societal effects theorising emerges from strong regions, such as Europe and 
Asia, where the integration of the firms, labour and management into society is 
different from the US.   
 
The transferred or internationalised workplace condenses the effects of globalising 
capitalist forces, national institutional rules and ‘world best practice’ work and 
employment standards within local and unique work situations. It is only through social 
interaction that groups and individuals negotiate which of these different (and perhaps 
competing) ways of working, standards of quality, authority relations and methods of 
employment will actually shape particular work situations. Whether sector norms on 
wages and working practices prevail, or company or local norms apply, is partly the 
outcome of these processes of social negotiation and interaction. Global international 
competition within mass markets puts cost pressures on all producers, and makes global 
wage rates important for location choice of TNC operations. But, as institutional 
economists and economic sociologists have established, wage rates are not 
homogeneous within markets, but rather segment and differentiate. And the same is 
true for work organisation and HR policies. It is therefore important to retain a research 
focus on the workplace, as it is here that the working out of workplace rules and 
practices emerges.  
 
Within the transferred workplace nationality is contested, not given. It remains an 
important boundary and differentiates the local from the transnational enterprise. But 
we need empirical research to uncover how interest groups use nationality as a 
boundary device for engaging in social action. For example, knowing that Japanese 
firms typically espouse the benefits of employment security may put Japanese 
managers in confrontation with local managers where host practices are based on hire 
and fire. Milkman (1991), in her case studies of Japanese firms in the US, quotes 
instances of firms using work share, reduced hours, flexible allocation of labour and 
other practices to retain labour through down turns in trade, when the first reaction of 
the American managers would be to layoff the workers. Milkman also quotes cases of 
American managers highlighting the inefficiencies of labour security, when hire and 
fire is deemed to weed out the unproductive worker. In this contest, Japanese managers 
may apply company-wide practices, which may be in conflict with local management 
practice, but American workers could ally with Japanese managers in seeking to 
maintain employment security through a downturn. In our Telford research we explore 
instances of British team leaders being in alliance with Japanese managers against 
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British managers’ preference for selection of team leaders on human relations 
consideration, not simply seniority and technical proficiency (Elger and Smith, 
forthcoming). In these instances, nationality is contested, and normal class divisions 
between workers and managers complicated by the addition of competing management 
practices and worker preference. 
 
For the workforce, being employed by a TNC may present different opportunities and 
constraints. The transferred workplace could be weakly embedded within local 
industrial relations institutions; it might be distinct from local custom and practice – 
seeking non-unionism or single unionism within predominately multi-union local 
environments. For example, in Smith and Elger (2000) we register the preferences of 
Japanese managers in constructing the ‘workplace policies of Japanese transplants in 
terms of the following agenda: 
 
 employment security guarantees; 
 desire for task flexibility; 
 quality consciousness higher than British standards; 
 single status (in respect to canteens, uniforms etc.) 
 hostility towards multiple and confrontational trade unionism; 
 respect for shop floor production workers; 
 hostility towards clerical or unproductive functions; 
 distinctively co-operative contractual relations with suppliers. 
 
This agenda challenged rather than accepted existing British IR and HRM practices, but 
the agenda, as we made clear in our Telford research, was also shaped by local 
conditions, and clustered TNC practices, such as anti-unionism and tolerance of high 
labour turnover. 
 
On the other hand, the TNC could be unionised and linked to other international units 
within the firm, and therefore exposed to working conditions, wages, trade union 
standards and practices different from those negotiated by local unions. For example, 
Unilever, Ford, Philips and other TNCs in Europe have shop stewards bodies that bring 
together workers representatives from across several countries for purposes of 
information exchange on the particular TNC. Within some regions, such as the 
European Union, legislation requires firms to set up works councils that can operate as 
a communication channel for workers in TNCs.  
 
For our cases of Japanese firms, it was widely predicted through structural or 
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deterministic analysis, that locating production of pre-designed products on new, 
greenfield sites, in areas of high unemployment, and recruiting young workers without 
previous working experience, would provide managers with the ideal ‘raw material’ in 
which to install Japanese work organisation practices (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). In 
other words, from choice of location, product, technology and labour, we could predict 
or determine the labour process outcomes of this menu. As our work has shown (Elger 
and Smith, 1998ab), unintended and dramatic outcomes of this particular cocktail 
occurred, especially high levels of labour turnover, worker absenteeism and withdrawal 
of effort, which had major implications from the quality of work organisation and 
employment relations within the factories. The unpredictability of workplace relations, 
comes from the ‘system contradictions’ within employment relations, but also the 
impossibility of seeing, from the outside, how the contingent combinations of particular 
workers and managers, in particular locations, sectors, and contexts, will actually 
interact to produce definite work and employment relation. It is both the systemic and 
contingent contradictions that necessitates empirical enquiry, as social agents are 
reflexive, and have choices over how they interact within the constraints they find 
themselves within. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The TNC is semi-autonomous of both home and host societal contexts, and therefore 
has an independence, which requires consideration in any evaluation of the diffusion of 
organisation or management practices from one country to another. Moreover, the 
clustering together of TNCs, especially for exports of mass produced commodities with 
a strong cost containment element, creates specific conditions, produced through 
TNC-local state interactions, which create common or systemic features to work and 
employment relations in these new town or special economic zone settings. As such, 
the home and host (societal) features of the TNC may be subordinate (or at least have to 
interact with) these ‘regional’ conditions. Further, these zones also provoke in workers, 
particular strategies to manage their labour power, in particular, mobility bargaining, 
rather than effort bargaining, as the mobility of capital defines the opportunities for 
conflict and opposition for labour. In turn, workers mobility bargaining produces 
common retention strategies, as outlined in Table 1. What this means for the study of 
work within the internationalised firm is that sector, region, locality and cluster (in 
addition to society) are required levels of causality of action and behaviors. This in turn 
makes simple diffusion models based on ‘national’ or ‘systemic’ theorising 
questionable and naïve to the complexities of interaction of the internationalised firm 
within global settings.  
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Table 1 Adaptation Strategies for High Labour Turnover Contexts 
 
STRATEGY CONTRACT 
SEGMENTATION 
PROCESS 
DESKILLING 
INTER-FIRM 
COLLUSION 
NEO-PATERNALISM LABOUR 
SUBSTITUTION 
 
FEATURES Putting LT risk onto low 
skill, temporary 
workers. 
Permanent/Temp 
division. 
Routine and systematic 
deskilling and 
fool-proofing of tasks to 
minimise disruption of 
labour mobility. 
No poaching 
agreements; blacklisting 
potential activists; 
standardisation of wages 
and benefits. 
Non Pecuniary, welfare, 
social and cultural 
benefits to integrate 
workers – loans, social 
events, 
community-relations 
building. 
Replacing high risk 
groups (especially 
young workers) with 
those with constrained 
mobility chances (older 
workers, married 
women, ethnic 
minorities). 
ADVATANGES  Close alignment 
between product market 
and labour supply. LT as 
an adjustment strategy. 
Cheapens labour and 
allows rapid substitution 
of workers who move. 
Can prevent routine job 
hopping and reduces 
unionisation threat. 
Initially cheap, and can 
build long-term labour 
supply. 
Loyalty may be high due 
to provision of work 
opportunity. 
DISADVANTAGES Low commitment, 
higher LT for temps, 
difficulty in modern 
production of separating 
‘core’ and ‘temporary’ 
workers. Stress for 
permanent workers. 
Reduces motivation for 
job flexibility, 
interchangeability and 
rotation, which is 
necessary in high LT 
context. 
Illegal. Subject to 
sanctions and inhibits 
firm-level initiatives. 
Workers are cynical in 
low trust, high LT 
contexts. Rising 
expectations can 
increase costs of 
benefits provision. 
Trade off between 
efficiency and mobility. 
E.g. age –ability 
bargain. Older workers 
may be more 
experienced and transfer 
different work cultures. 
SUSTAINABILITY May be difficult to 
sustain. 
Sustainable for 
low-grade, assembly 
work. Harder to 
introduce in 
manufacturing and 
design work. 
Breaks down due to 
pressures of market 
competition. 
Breaks down if wages 
rise elsewhere. Requires 
long-term management 
action. 
Sustainable. 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abo, Tetsuo. (ed.) 1994 Hybrid Factory: The Japanese Production System in the 
United States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Abo, T. 1998. ‘Hybridization of the Japanese Production System in North America, 
Newly Industrializing Economies, South-east Asia and Europe: Contrasting 
Configurations’, in Boyer, R. et al. (eds), Between Imitation and Innovation: The 
 24 
Transfer and Hybridization of Production Models in the International Automobilie 
Industry, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Ackroyd, Stephen., Burrell, Gibson., Hughes, Michael. and Whitaker, Alan. 1988. ‘The 
Japanization of British industry?’, Industrial Relations Journal, 19.1: 11-23 
 
Aoki, M. and Dore, R. (eds), 1994. The Japanese Firm: Sources of Competitive 
Strength, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Beecher, Schon. and Bird, Allan 1994. ‘The Best of Both Worlds? Human resource 
management practices in US-based Japanese affiliates’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred 
Burton (eds) Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global 
Kaisha, London: Routledge 
 
Boyer, R. 1998. ‘Hybridisation and Models of Production: Geography, History and 
Theory’, in Boyer, R., Charron, E., Jurgens, U., and Tolliday, S. (eds), Between 
Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer and Hybridization of Productive Models in the 
International Automobile Industry, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Boyer. R. Charron, E., Jurgens, U., and Tolliday, S. 1998. ‘Conclusion: Transplants, 
Hybridisation and Globalisation: What lessons for the future?’ in Boyer, R. et al. (eds), 
Between Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer and Hybridization of Productive 
Models in the International Automobile Industry, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Broad, Geoffrey. 1994. ‘The Managerial Limits to Japanisation’, Human Resource 
Management Journal, 4.3: 41-61. 
 
Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. 1994. The Management of Innovation, (third edition) 
Oxford: OUP. 
 
Burton, Fred and Saelens, Freddy. 1994. ‘International Alliances as a Strategic Tool of 
Japanese Electronics Companies’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton (eds) Japanese 
Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global Kaisha, London: Routledge 
 
Child, J. 2000 ‘Theorizing about organizations cross-nationally’ in Advances in 
International Comparative Management Volume 13, Stamford, Connecticut: JAI Press. 
 
Cheung, Chiwai and Wong, Kwan-yui 2000 ‘Japanese Investment in China: A Glo-cal 
 25 
Perspective’ in Si-ming Li and Wing-shing Tang (eds.) China’s Regions, Polity, and 
Economy, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 
 
Danford, A. 1999 Japanese Management Techniques and British Workers, London: 
Mansell 
 
Dedoussis, V. 1994. ‘The Core Workforce-Peripheral Workforce Dichotomy and the 
Transfer of Japanese Management Practices’, in Campbell, N. and Burton, F. (eds.), 
Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global Kaisha, London: 
Routledge.  
 
Dedoussis, V. 1995. ‘Simply a Question of Cultural Barriers? The Search for New 
Perspectives in the Transfer of Japanese Management Practices’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 32.6: 731-746  
 
Delbridge, R. 1998 Life on the Line in Contemporary Manufacturing: the workplace 
experience of lean production and the ‘Japanese’ model, Oxford: OUP 
 
Dicken, P. 1998. Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy, [third edition], 
London: Paul Chapman. 
 
Dohse, Knuth., Jurgens, Ulrich., and Malsch, Thomas. 1985. ‘From “Fordism” to 
“Toyotaism”? The Social Organisation of the Labour Process in the Japanese 
Automobile Industry’, Politics and Society, 14.2: 115-146. 
 
Dunning, John H. 1993 ‘The Changing Dynamics of International Production’, in John 
H. Dunning, The Globalisation of Business: the Challenges of the 1990s, London: 
Routledge 
 
Dunning, J.H. 2000. ‘The New Geography of Foreign Direct Investment’, in Woods, N. 
(ed) The Political Economy of Globalization, London: Macmillan. 
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, Chris. 1994. ‘Introduction’ and ‘Global Japanization? 
Convergence and Competition in the Organization of the Labour Process’, in Elger, T., 
and Smith, C. (eds) Global Japanization? The Transnational Transformation of the 
Labour Process, London: Routledge.  
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, Chris. 1997. ‘Japanese Take-over, British Management: 
 26 
reworking design and development within a computer company’ 15th Annual 
International Labour Process Conference, University of Edinburgh, March  
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, Chris. 1998a. ‘Exit, Voice and Mandate: Management 
Strategies and Labour Practices of Japanese Firms in Britain’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 36.2: 185-207.  
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, C. 1998b. ‘New Town, New Capital, New Workplace? The 
employment relations of Japanese inward investors in a West Midlands new town’, 
Economy and Society, 27.4: 578-608. 
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, C. 1999a. ‘“Good Enough Production” and the Shaping of 
Worker Co-operation, Compliance and Non-Compliance in a Japanese Transplant’, 
17th Annual International Labour Process Conference, Royal Holloway, University of 
London, March.  
 
Elger, Tony and Smith, Chris. 1999b. ‘Japanese Inward Investors and the Remaking of 
Employment and Production Regimes: the British Case’, in Andrea Eckardt, 
Holm-Detlev Köhler and Ludger Pries (eds) Global Players in lokalen Bindungen: 
Unternehmens globalisierung in Soziologischer Perspektive, [Berlin: Sigma Rainer 
Bohn Verlag] pp 99-134.  
 
Encarnation, Dennis. and Mason, Mark. 1994. ‘Does Ownership Matter? Answers and 
Implications for Europe and America’, in M. Mason and D. Encarnation (eds) Does 
Ownership Matter? Japanese Multinationals in Europe, Oxford: OUP. 
 
Ferner, Anthony. 1997. ‘Country of origin effects and HRM in multinational 
companies’, Human Resource Management Journal, 7.1: 19-37. 
 
Florida, R., and Kenney, M. 1991 ‘Organisation versus Culture: Japanese Automotive 
Transplants in the United States’, Industrial Relations Journal, 22.3: 181-196. 
 
M. Freyssenet et al. (eds) 1999 One Best Way? Trajectories and Industrial Models of 
the World’s Automobile Producers, Oxford: OUP. 
 
Fruin, Mark. 1999. ‘Site-specific Organization Learning in International Technology 
Transfer: example  form Toshiba’, in Liker, J.K., Fruin, W.M. and Adler, P.S. (eds) 
Remade in America: Transplanting and Transforming Japanese Management Systems, 
 27 
Oxford: OUP. 
 
Garrahan, P. and Stewart, P. 1992. The Nissan Enigma: Flexibility at work in a local 
economy, London: Cassell 
 
Gereffi, G. and Korzeniewicz, M. (eds) 1994. Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism, Westport, CT.: Praeger. 
 
Gereffi, G. 1994. ‘Capitalism, Development and Global Commodity Chains’, in Sklair, 
L.  (ed.), Capitalism and Development, London: Routledge. 
 
Gereffi, G. 1996. ‘Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia’, 
Journal of Asian Business, 12.1: 75-112. 
 
Graham, L. 1995. On the Line at Subaru-Isuzu: the Japanese Model and the American 
Worker, New York: ILR/ Cornell UP. 
 
Haslam, C. and Williams, K. with Johal, S. and Williams, J. 1996. ‘A Fallen Idol? 
Japanese management in the 1990s’ in Stewart, P. (ed) Beyond Japanese Management: 
the End of Modern Times? London: Frank Cass  
 
Hollingsworth, J. R., Schmitter, P. C. and Streeck, W. (eds.) (1994) Governing 
Capitalist Economies: Performance & Control of Economic Sectors Oxford: OUP 
 
Itagaki, Hiroshi (ed.) 1997. The Japanese Production System: Hybrid Factories in East 
Asia, London: Macmillan. 
 
Jurgens, Ulrich., Malsch, Thomas. and Dohse, Knuth. 1993. Breaking From Taylorism: 
changing forms of work in the automobile industry, Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Kenney, Martin. 1999. ‘Transplantation? A Comparison of Japanese Assembly Plants 
in Japan and the United States’, in Liker, J.K., Fruin, W.M. and Adler, P.S. (eds) 
Remade in America: Transplanting and Transforming Japanese Management Systems, 
Oxford: OUP.   
 
Kenney, M. and Florida, R. 1993. Beyond Mass Production: the Japanese System and 
its Transfer to the US, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 28 
Kenney, M. and Florida, R. 1994 ‘Japanese Maquiladoras: Production Organisation and 
Global Commodity Chains’, World Development, 22.1: 27-44. 
 
Kenney, M., Goe, W.R., Contreras, O., Romero, J. and Bustos, M. 1998. ‘Learning 
Factories or Reproduction Factories? Labor-Management Relations in the Japanese 
Consumer Electronics Maquiladoras in Mexico’, Work and Occupations, 25.3: 
269-304. 
 
Kenney, M., Goe, W.R., Contreras, O., Romero, J. and Bustos, M. 1999. 
‘Labor-Management Relations in the Japanese Consumer Electronics Maquiladoras’, 
in Beechler, Schon. and Bird, Allan (eds) Japanese Multinationals Abroad: Individual 
and Organizational Learning, New York: OUP 
Kenney, M.  
 
Kogut, B. and Parkinson, D. 1993. ‘The Diffusion of American Organising Principles 
to Europe’, in Kogut, B. (ed.), Country Competitiveness, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lane, Christel 1995 Industry and Society in Europe. Stability and Change in Britain, 
Germany and France Aldershot: Edward Elgar  
 
Liker, Jeffrey K., Fruin, W. Mark. and Adler, Paul S. 1999. ‘Bringing Japanese 
Management to the United states: Transplantation or Transformation? in Liker, J.K., 
Fruin, W.M. and Adler, P.S. (eds.) Remade in America: Transplanting and 
Transforming Japanese Management Systems, Oxford: OUP.   
 
Lowe, J., Morris, J. and Wilkinson, B. 2000. ‘British Factory, Japanese Factory and 
Mexican Factory: an international comparison of front line management and 
supervision’, Journal of Management Studies, 37: 541-562.  
 
MacDuffie, J 1995 ‘Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: 
Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in he World Auto Industry’ 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48, 2: 197-221. 
 
Maurice, M. and Sorge, A. (eds.) 2000 Embedding Organizations: Societal Analysis of 
Actor, Organisations and Socio-Economic Context Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Co 
 
 29 
Milkman, R. 1991. Japan’s California Factories: Labor Relations and Economic 
Globalisation, Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California. 
 
Milkman, R. 1992. ‘The Impact of Foreign Investment on US Industrial Relations: the 
Case of California’s Japanese-Owned Plants’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 13: 
151-182. 
 
Morgan, Glenn., Sharpe, Diane Rosemary., Kelly, W. and Whitley, R. 2000. ‘The 
Future of Japanese Manufacturing in the UK’, ILPC Paper, Strathcylde (submitted to 
JMS) 
 
Morris, J. and Wilkinson, B. 1995. ‘The Transfer of Japanese  Management Techniques 
to Alien Institutional Environments’, Journal of Management Studies, 32.6: 719-730. 
 
Mueller, F. 1994. ‘Societal effect, organisational effect and globalisation’, 
Organization Studies, 15.3 
 
Mueller, Frank. 1996. ‘National Stakeholders in the Global Contest for Corporate 
Investment’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 2 
 
Oliver, Nick., and Wilkinson, Barry. 1992. (2nd ed) The Japanisation of British Industry: 
New developments in the 1990s, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Palmer, Gerry. 1996. ‘Reviving Resistance: The Japanese Factory Floor in Britain’, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 27.2: 129-143. 
 
Palmer, G. 2000.  Embeddedness and Workplace Relations: a Case-study of a 
British-based Japanese Manufacturing Company, PhD Thesis, University of Warwick. 
 
Parker, M., and Slaughter, J. 1988. ‘Management-by-stress: the team concept in the US 
automobile industry’, Technology Review, October: 37-44.  
 
Sharpe, Diana. 1997 ‘Managerial Control Strategies and Sub-cultural Processes: on the 
shop-floor in a Japanese manufacturing organisation in the UK’, in A. Sackmann (ed) 
Cultural Complexity in Organisations: Inherent Contrasts and Contradictions, Sage 
 
Sharpe, Diama Rosemary (1998) Shop Floor Practices Under Changing Forms of 
Management Control: a Comparative Ethnographic Study, PhD Manchester Business 
 30 
School. 
 
Smith, C. and Elger, T. 1998a ‘Greenfields and “Wildebeests”: Management Strategies 
and Labour Turnover in Japanese Firms in Telford’, Employee Relations, 20.3: 
271-284.  
 
Smith, C. and Meiksins, P. 1995. ‘System, Society and Dominance Effects in 
Cross-National Organisational Analysis’, Work, Employment and Society, 9.2: 
241-268. 
 
Smith, Chris 1996 ‘Japan, The Hybrid Factory and Cross-National Organisational 
Theory’, Special Issue ‘Vernetzung und Vereinnahmung -Arbeit zwischen 
Internationlisierung und neuen Manaegmentkonzepten, Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur 
Soziologie (Austrian Journal of Sociology) 3: 105-130 
 
Smith, C. and Elger, T 2000 ‘The Societal Effects School and Transnational Transfer: 
The Case of Japanese Investment in Britain’ in Marc Maurice and Arndt Sorge (eds.) 
Embedding Organizations: Societal Analysis of Actor, Organisations and 
Socio-Economic Context Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co  
 
Smith, C., Ladino, C., and Elger, T. 2001 ‘Mexican and English Japanese Transplants: 
Labour Turnover and Management Control. Points of Comparison and the debate on 
Japanese Employment Relations’ in Jorge Carrillo, Noe Aron Fuentes and Alfonso 
Mercando Garcia (eds.) Memoria de la Conferencia Internacional: Libre comercio, 
integracion y el futoro de la industrial maquiladora. Produccion gobal y trabajadoroes 
locales, Mexico: Secrateria del Trabajo y Provision Social and El Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte  
 
Smith, Chris 2001 ‘Should I go or should I stay?’ The Double Indeterminacy of Labour 
Power. Labour Process and Labour Mobility. Towards a Theoretical Integration’ 19th 
International Labour Process Conference, 26-28 March 2001, School of Management, 
Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
Smith, C, Daskalaki, M., Brown, D. and Elger, T. 2002 ‘Labour Turnover and 
Management Retention Strategies in New Manufacturing Plants’ International Journal 
of Human Resource Management (forthcoming) 
 
Smith, Chris 2002 ‘Living at Work. Management Control and the Chinese Dormitory 
 31 
Labour System’ Asia Pacific Journal of Management (forthcoming) 
 
Sorge, A. 1991. ‘Strategic Fit and the Societal Effect: Interpreting Cross-national 
Comparisons of Technology, Organisation and Human Resources’, Organisation 
Studies, 12.2 161-190 
 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1992. ‘National Diversity, Regime Competition and Institutional 
Deadlock: Problems in Forming a European Industrial Relations System’, Journal of 
Public Policy, 12.4: 301-330. 
 
Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J. 1986. ‘Introduction: Between Fordism and Flexibility’, in S. 
Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.) The Automobile Industry and its Workers, Cambridge: 
Polity 
 
Trevor, Malcolm. 1983. Japan’s Reluctant Multinationals: Japanese management at 
Home and Abroad, London: Francis Pinter Trevor, Malcolm. 1983. Japan’s Reluctant 
Multinationals: Japanese management at Home and Abroad, London: Francis Pinter 
 
Turnbull, Peter. 1986. ‘The “Japanization” of Production and Industrial Relations at 
Lucas Electrical’, Industrial Relations Journal, 17.3: 193-206. 
 
White, M. and Trevor, M. 1983. Under Japanese Management: the Experience of 
British Workers, London: Heinemann. 
 
Williams, K., Haslam, C., Williams, J., Adcroft, A. and Johal, S. 1991. ‘Factories 
versus Warehouses: Japanese Manufacturing Foreign Direct Investment in Britain and 
the US’, Occasional Papers on Business, Economy and Society 6, London: Polytechnic 
of East London  
 
Womack J. D. Jones P. T. and Roos D. 1990. The Machine that Changed the World: the 
Triumph of Lean Production, New York: Rawson Associates 
 
 
